OWNING MY THROWNNESS-INTO-OTHERS
Extending Intersubjective-Systems Theory Perspectives on Experiences of Personal Ownership and Individuality

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“As ... something that has been thrown, [human being] has been brought into its ‘there,’ 'but not of its own accord.... This ‘not’ belongs to the existential meaning of ‘thrownness.’”

Heidegger (1927)

“Phenomenological philosophers tell us that we find ourselves in the worlds we inhabit. We are born --thrown, they say-- into worlds of family culture, race, and class that we do not choose... into families that are more or less stable and relationally capable. We are always already situated.”

Donna Orange (2009)

“You can choose your friends, but not your family.”

Old Saying

Introduction: In this presentation, I extend psychoanalyst and philosopher Robert Stolorow’s (2009 & 2010) work in which he uses Heidegger (1927) to contend that a person’s emotional ownership of his existential anxiety and grief --feelings that disclose the person’s own temporal finitude, and that of his connections to loved ones-- enriches his sense of individuality. In my extension of this work, I use Heidegger (1927) in a
similar fashion to argue that a person’s sense of individuality is further enriched, and rendered even more distinctive, when he owns the feelings that reflect his helpless embeddedness in other people, especially caregivers and their emotional characters, or what I call his *thrownness-into-others*. I contend that a person’s ownership --that is, willful integration into awareness-- of his emotional experiences of his thrownness-into-others contributes to a sense of self as distinctively constituted by the human relationships into which his emotional development has been delivered. In contrast, when integration of these experiences is developmentally derailed, the person’s feelings of personal ownership and individuality become stripped of this constitutive otherness, and the vulnerable determinism of his embeddedness in it; they become decontextualized (Maduro, 2008) and unworlded.

**Methodology: Interplay Between Heidegger’s Existential Philosophy and Psychoanalysis.** In this presentation, my psychoanalytic research method is interdisciplinary in nature. In it, I harvest the phenomenological and explanatory fruits produced by the interplay between Heidegger’s (1927) existential philosophy, namely, the study of the *a priori* or universal structures of human being, and psychoanalysis. On one level, Heidegger’s existential philosophy provides phenomenological guidance and philosophical grounding to psychoanalytic thinking; and on another level, psychoanalytic findings provide experiential evidence that supports, expands or checks against his

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1 Among others who have beneficially integrated psychoanalysis with foreign disciplines, see Slavin & Kriegman (1992).

2 For Heidegger, *existential philosophy* is a particular form of *ontology*. Whereas ontology refers to the study of the Being (intelligibility) of beings, his existential philosophy --as expounded in *Being and Time* (1927)-- is a particular ontology concerned with the human kind of Being, which he called *existence*. 
philosophy.

I study the interplay between Heidegger and psychoanalysis --or, more specifically, intersubjective-systems theory-- along two dimensions: the phenomenological (which entails my concern with illuminating personal organizations of experience) and the contextual (which entails my concern with explaining such experiential organizations in terms of the relational contexts in which they have taken form). With respect to each dimension, the foundation for my method lies in the central importance that both intersubjective-systems theory and Heidegger ascribes to affectivity as *disclosive*.

In intersubjective-systems theory, the individual person’s affectivity discloses the subjective structures that emerge from lived experience in his relational world. And in Heidegger (1927), affectivity is the primordial avenue through which “Being-in-the-world” is disclosed to itself (Stolorow 2011, p. 136, italics added). For Heidegger (1927), it is “[t]hrough mood [that] humans gain access to their world, to themselves and to their relations with others in the world….” (Elkholy, 2008, p. 4).

Thus, just as the subjective structures deriving from a person’s lived experience in relationships with others organize and disclose themselves in his affective life, so too do

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3 My psychoanalytic perspective is rooted in the intersubjective-systems theory framework (see Stolorow, Atwood & Ross, 1978; Stolorow & Atwood, 1979; Atwood & Stolorow, 1984; Stolorow, Brandchaft & Atwood, 1987; Stolorow & Atwood, 1992; Orange, 1995; Orange, Atwood & Stolorow, 1997; Stolorow, Atwood & Orange, 2002; Stolorow, 2007, 2009, 2010, 2011) in which psychoanalysis is deemed a *phenomenological contextualism* (Stolorow, 2011). “It is phenomenological in that it investigates and illuminates worlds of emotional experience. It is contextual in that it holds that such organizations of emotional experience take form, both developmentally and in the psychoanalytic situation, in constitutive intersubjective contexts” (Stolorow, 2011, p. 19).

4 In intersubjective-systems theory, the individual person’s affective life is understood to develop and become organized by his personal emotional exchanges with important others from at least birth onward (Atwood & Stolorow, 1984).

5 In fact, Elkholy (2008) characterizes Heidegger’s existential philosophy as a “metaphysics of feeling” (p. 6).
the universal structures of the person’s *being-in-the-world* organize and disclose themselves in his affective life (Heidegger, 1927; Elkholy, 2008; Stolorow, 2011). Given this, useful interplay and analogue studies becomes possible between philosophical phenomenology, and the ontological structures of world-embedded human being it reveals in its study of affect, and psychoanalytic phenomenology, and the experiential structures --whether of world-embedded being or disembedded being, or other organizations-- that it illuminates in its study of affect. The study of affectivity emerges as the royal road to understanding the structures of both the experiencing human being and such being’s experiences of its being, as well as correlations between them.

**Interplay Between Heidegger’s Existential Philosophy and Psychoanalysis, as Illuminated by Stolorow.** Since the work of mine I present today is an extension of Stolorow’s (2009 & 2010), I need to briefly describe it. Stolorow demonstrated several multi-faceted points of interplay between Heidegger’s notion of *authentic existence* and intersubjective-systems theory.

Now, Heidegger (1927) vividly illuminated a critical ontological nexus between authentic ownership of one’s existence and personal distinctiveness. For Heidegger, authentic existing entails the person’s non-evasive *ownership* of the finitude that is constitutive of *his* being. Perhaps the most central feature of a human being’s constitutive finitude --for Heidegger-- is its temporal finitude, as captured in his notion of *being-toward-death*. Thus authentic existence consists in non-evasive ownership of one’s *being-toward-death* and the anxiety that discloses it.

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6 For Heidegger, lived “experiences of mood, or of certain moods, are ontologically revelatory” (Stolorow, 2011, p. 136).
Now, the existential nexus between ownership of being-toward-death and individualized existence is grounded in Heidegger’s understanding that a person’s death is inalienable and exclusively his. Ownership of it inherently individualizes and singularizes him because the person’s dying is only and distinctively his. He writes:

No one can take [another’s] dying away from him…. By its very essence, death is in every case mine…. Mineness … [is] ontologically constitutive for death (Stolorow, 2009, p. 8, quoting Heidegger, 1927, p. 284).

Unfortunately, Heidegger’s exclusive focus on the person’s own temporal finitude, as well as on its unsharability (from which its exquisite mineness derives), suggests that ownership of it occurs in a context of radical separation and isolation from others. What about the role other human beings play in a person’s being-toward-death? And what about the person’s unavoidable encounter with the temporal finitude of important others in his life, and his connections to them? Where is the “other” in Heidegger’s notion of authentic existence?

Since relational psychoanalysis knows subjective emotional experiences of ownership (mineness) and distinctive being (individuality) to be constitutively relational, Stolorow needed to relationalize Heidegger’s notion of authentic existence. Only a relational ontology can have comparative and analogue value to relational psychoanalytic phenomenology and explanation. Operating as philosopher, Stolorow (2009; 2010) does

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7 The question is this: Are others of little or no consequence in Heidegger’s existential philosophy, whether with respect to being-toward-death or -loss (i.e., existential content) or the role of others in the person’s ownership of his existence (i.e., existential process)?

8 Of course, Stolorow also knew that ownership of loss of other, and its grief, were equiprimorial with loss of self (death) and its anxiety from his own personal and clinical experiences (see, Stolorow, 2007, Ch. 3).
just this. In short, he successfully establishes the relationality in both the what, i.e., existential content, and how, i.e., existential process, of Heidegger’s authentic existing.\textsuperscript{9}

First, Stolorow establishes the place of other in authentic existence by showing that the what of authentic existence entails not just the person’s own unique temporal finitude, but also the finitude of the person’s connections with loved ones.\textsuperscript{10} Demonstrating a first point of inter-disciplinary interplay, Stolorow then imports this relationalized view of authentic existence into his psychoanalytic phenomenology and makes the following claim: a person’s intrinsic sense of mineness or ownership of his emotional life is enhanced by non-evasive ownership of not just the existential vulnerability, anxiety and dread of his own unsharable death, but also of the anticipatory and full-blown grief that reflect the finitude of his connections to the loved-others in his life.

In turn, and reflecting the phenomenological nexus between ownership and individuality in both Heidegger and psychoanalysis, Stolorow contends that ownership of this existentially disclosive anxiety and grief is central to development of enriched feelings of distinctive, individualized selfhood (Stolorow 2010).\textsuperscript{11} Owning the anxiety of


\textsuperscript{10} Stolorow (2009) writes: “Authentic being-toward-death entails owning up not only to one’s own finitude but also to the finitude of all those with whom we are deeply connected…. [A]uthentic being-toward-death always includes being-toward-loss as a central constitutent. Just as we are ‘always dying already’ (Heidegger 1927, p. 298), so too are we always already grieving” (p. 10).

\textsuperscript{11} With respect to this latter contention, Heideggers’ existential philosophy thus serves to expand existing clinical knowledge of the developmental importance of affect ownership in feelings of distinctive selfhood (see Socarides & Stolorow 1984/85; Atwood & Stolorow, 1992; Stolorow 2007).
existential self-loss, and the grief for loss of the others in his life, enriches the person’s sense of individuality with a sense of its constitutive relationality.\textsuperscript{12}

Second, Stolorow establishes the \textit{role of other} in authentic existence by showing that the \textit{how} of non-evasively owned existential pain entails what Heidegger called \textit{solicitude}. In solicitude, Stolorow (2010) shows, others “leap ahead” of the person, “welcoming and encouraging his or her individualized selfhood by liberating him or her to exist for the sake of his or her ownmost possibilities of being” (p. 9), including \textit{not just} the possibility of death, and the existential anxiety that discloses it, \textit{but also} the possibility of loss, and the existential grief that discloses it. Stolorow then imports this notion of \textit{solicitude} into his psychoanalysis as a corroborating model for the type of receptive, encouraging caregiver attunement\textsuperscript{13} that facilitates a person’s ownership of his existential anxiety and grief, as well as his sense of individuality as distinctively contextualized by the certainties of inalienable self-loss and loss of important others.\textsuperscript{14}

Stolorow contends coextensively that a person’s sense of mineness and distinctive selfhood is obstructed, undermined, and dissociated from his sense of self within relational contexts of unsolicitous mal-attunement in which the caregiver is perceived to

\textsuperscript{12} And, by extension, it accords with clinical evidence that a person’s \textit{dis}ownership of affect --particularly existentially disclosive affect-- subverts enriched feelings of personal ownership and distinctive selfhood.

\textsuperscript{13} In this article, by “attunement” and “mal-attunement” I mean, respectively, the myriad forms of development-facilitating, and development-disrupting, caregiver responsiveness to affect and perception that may transpire in a particular intersubjective context.

Among others who have beneficially integrated psychoanalysis with foreign disciplines, see Slavin & Kriegman (1992).

\textsuperscript{14} In this way, Stolorow fruitfully harvests and imports this Heideggerian notion of the \textit{how} of authentic existence, i.e., relational existential process, into his psychoanalytic explanation of the relational contexts that facilitate and enrich feelings of ownership and individuality.
require the person’s abandonment of his own distinctive existential affectivity and accommodation to the caregiver’s needs.\textsuperscript{15}

**Ownership of Thrownness-Into-Other and Enriched Feelings of Individuality.**

Now I wish to re-introduce my particular claim and explore a few additional points of interplay between Heidegger and psychoanalysis. As you may recall from my above *Introduction*, my basic thesis is that a person’s ownership of the distinctive experiences of his deterministic, existential deliverance into past and present caregiving relationships -- that is, his deliverance into the affective arms of other important human beings in his life-- further enriches his self-experience on the level of individuality. My thesis is grounded in the broad explanatory conviction that --from a psychoanalytic perspective-- caregiving human relationships constitute the central and often most determinative context into which a person’s emotional life\textsuperscript{16} is delivered.

*The Relationality of Emotional Experience as Empirical Indicia of the Relationality of Heidegger’s Authentic Existence.* This broad explanatory conviction is supported by Heidegger’s concept of *Mitsein*, or “Being-with,” which is “the existential structure underpinning relatedness” (Stolorow, 2009, p. 143).\textsuperscript{17} However, despite the otherwise powerfully contextualizing and worlding force of Heidegger’s thinking, his notion of *Mitsein* is remarkably impoverished (Frie, 2010). For this reason, in this point of

\textsuperscript{15} It is hopefully also evident that our psychoanalytic understandings of the relational systems that facilitate, or obstruct, experiences of self --like ownership and individuality-- can be offered back to Heidegger’s existential philosophy as analogous to, and thus empirical support for, the structures of solititude that he deemed critical in authentic existing.

\textsuperscript{16} Including in particular the possibility of his emotionally owning his feelings and developing a strong sense of individuality.

\textsuperscript{17} It is also supported by the relationality that Stolorow established in Heidegger’s conception of authentic existence, as described above.
I find relational psychoanalysis—as empirical science—to be in a better position to enhance Heidegger’s ontological doctrine of *Mitsein* than Heidegger’s existential philosophy is to ground psychoanalysis’ empirically based relational conviction.

Accordingly, I claim that human emotional life is constitutively embedded in the other, or relationship, in a manner that parallels the ontological embeddedness of any particular human being in other particular human beings, and that non-evasive ownership of the affects and perceptions of this existentially thick, relational embeddedness enrich the sense of individuality.

Let me elaborate my empirically grounded, relational psychoanalytic conviction, especially as it pertains to experiences of ownership and individuality. It is now well-established within the relational psychoanalytic community that a person’s emotional experience, including experiences of ownership and individuality, are significantly—albeit not exclusively—determined and constituted by the contexts of interaction with his caregivers and their emotional worlds. A person’s emotional life takes form, emerges, is felt or not felt, transforms, or fails to transform—as the case may be—within the relational contexts or systems co-constituted by him and his caregivers. Mitchell (1988) captured this relational psychoanalytic conviction succinctly:

Desire [and I might say, more generally, *all affect*] is experienced always *in the context of relatedness*, and it is that context which defines its meaning…. Mind is composed of relational configurations…. Experience is understood as structured through interactions…. (pp. 3 – 4, bracketed text mine).
The same conviction is captured in the pervasive assertion within intersubjective-systems literature of the intersubjective contextuality of affective experiencing (see e.g., Atwood & Stolorow 1984; Stolorow 2007). Within the intersubjective-systems theory framework, a person’s caregiving relationships --whether characterized by emotional attunement or mal-attunement, and, thus, for better and for worse-- are centrally, though not exclusively, constitutive of a person’s emotional life. In particular, they produce in the person lasting convictions, expectations and attitudes about his distinctive affect (Orange, Atwood, & Stolorow 1997, p. 80) and himself (Socarides & Stolorow 1984/85).

Thus, caregiver attunement and/or mal-attunement to a person’s distinctive affect define his “feelings about his feelings” (Lynne Jacobs, 2008, personal communication) in ways that either facilitate or inhibit development of the sense of these feelings as mine. These convictions, expectations, attitudes and feelings-about-feelings thereby operate to then determine whether or not the person can and will subsequently own --integrate, embrace, bear, tolerate-- and live in his feelings.

In turn, caregiving relationships and their role in a person’s ownership of his affect as mine, especially painful affect (see Stolorow & Atwood 1992), become constitutive of his sense of individuality. Why? Because they also shape whether he experiences his emotions as distinctive features of himself that are valid and worthy of a differentiated home in the world or, in the alternative, as invalid, unworthy and unwelcome aspects of himself that he dare not feel and live in as distinctive of his person.
In short, in this point of interplay I assert two claims: first, that ownership and individuality are constitutively contextualized --experientially, but also no doubt ontologically-- by other human beings, and our relationships with them; and, second, that emotional ownership of this existentially thick relational contextuality leads to expansive feelings of self as distinctively constituted by other.

Throwness-into-Others and the Developmental Value of Non-Evasively Owning the Affects that Disclose it. I turn attention now to a third aspect of my thesis, namely, the possibility and developmental value of a person experiencing the helpless deliverance of his emotional life into defining human relationships. Now, Heidegger (1927) addresses the human being’s deliverance into its finite time and world in his concept of “throwness.” He (Heidegger 1927, pp. 329 – 330, emphasis added) writes:

As … something that has been thrown, [human being] has been brought into its “there,” but not of its own accord…. This “not” belongs to the existential meaning of “throwness.”

And Stolorow (2007, p. 53, end-note 6) expands as follows:

By the term throwness Heidegger designates our already having been delivered over to a situatedness (“facticity”) and kind of Being that are not of our choosing or under our control.

I wish to draw attention to a particular aspect of throwness, namely, the person’s experiential --and no doubt existential-- throwness-into-others, especially the helpless deliverance of his emotional development\(^{18}\) into the caregiving relationships of

\(^{18}\) Including the possibilities for ownership and individuality.
attunement and mal-attunement that structure and organize it (for example, in the ways described above). I import Heidegger’s idea of thrownness into my psychoanalytic phenomenology in order to claim that a person’s non-evasive emotional ownership of both his existential embeddedness in other and the existential limits to his control over, and agency within, this embeddedness, leads to peculiarly rich feelings of distinctive, contextualized selfhood.

**Contextualized Ownership.** I claim that a person’s integration into awareness of his experiences of caregiver attunement or mal-attunement throughout the life-span expands, enriches and transforms the sense of personal ownership into a relationally historicized ownership. His sense of owning his emotional life comes to entail a sense of his feelings being deeply embedded in his world of irreversible past, present and future interactions with caregivers, both fortunate and unfortunate. Ownership of his relationally-situated and other-constituted feelings might entail expansive joy in, and gratitude for, those of his caregivers’ attunements that enabled him to claim and live in his affects as mine. Alternatively, such ownership might entail sadness or perhaps even horror reflective of the unfortunate mal-attunement that characterized his developmental system and initially undermined his ability to claim and live in his feelings as mine.

In short, there is a developmental value in owning one’s past and present relational gifts and traumas. There is a value in coming to terms with the relational fortunes and/or traumas that have been given to, and thereby distinguish, one’s existence and emotional life, perhaps especially those that constitutively shape one’s sense of mineness (see
Brandchaft 2007). In this regard, Donna Orange (2009) writes of one’s ability to find one’s way “to a kind of personal acceptance [that] … this is my life…” (p. 4).

**Distinctive, Contextualized Individuality.** I claim a person’s non-evasive experience of his relational embeddedness transforms his sense of distinctive selfhood into feelings of self as distinctively constituted by its own relational history (and present). It is transformed into what I call, from time to time, distinctive, worlded-selfhood. Such experiences of ever relationally-situated individuality might include identification and even pride in those of my caregivers’ attunements to my distinctive affects and perceptions that facilitated my sense of individuality. Alternatively, they might entail features of grief, resentment, or even horror that my caregivers’ emotional limitations required me to become what they needed me to be, thereby undermining (perhaps initially crushing) my sense of individualized selfhood.

**Contextualized Powerlessness.** Additionally, I claim a person’s non-evasive experience of the deterministism that significantly characterizes his thrownness-into-others leads to enrichment of his sense of individuality. A person’s emotional ownership of his thrownness into the interactions with caregiving others that come to constitute his unique emotional world will contribute to an enriched sense of himself as individualized by the helplessness and choicelessness of his deliverance into his relational there. Grandiose feelings of invulnerable autonomy, or super-agentic individuality, would yield developmentally to humbling experiences of oneself and one’s emotional experiencing as individualized by one’s deterministic deliverance into complex, constitutive interactions with important others. One might feel surrender --colored by joy or sadness-- that the
others in one’s life are inalienably constitutive of one’s being and distinctive selfhood. My others are profoundly with me in one form, and to one degree, or another whether I like it or not.

*The Relational Contexts that Facilitate or Obstruct Ownership of My Thrownness-Into-Other.* With respect to the importance of owning experiences of relationality (the “into-others” facet of such thrownness), one might ask: how can that which seems in so many ways quintessentially not mine or not me, namely, the emotional gifts and limitations of the caregiving-others into whose emotional arms my development is thrown, come to be owned as features of my distinctive selfhood?

I contend that caregiver discernment of, and attunement to, a person’s distinctive experiences of his relational context --that is, his perceptions of, and affective reactions to, his emotional interactions with others-- enables him to integrate them as his or mine. Further, such attunement enables him to own them as valid and worthy manifestations of himself as distinctively-situated-in-other --that is, as self individualized by his interactions with, and embeddedness in, caregiving others (see Maduro 2008).

Such caregiver discernment and attunement must extend to the person’s experience of all the personal qualities and actions of his caregivers, and their meanings for him, especially when his perceptions are in disharmony with their narcissism. Thus, in the treatment context, analytic focus in cases of trauma would extend to the patient’s views of, and feelings about, what has transpired between him and his primary caregivers, and between him and his analyst in the transference, perhaps with special attention to reactive hurt, disappointment, grief, fear, terror, horror and other depressive affects. In treatment
contexts that include a history of greater relational fortune, analytic focus would extend to the patient’s perceptions and affects reflective of his primary caregivers’ (and hopefully analyst’s) attunement, understanding, generosity, emotional gifts, and even love, including the patient’s reactive appreciation, affection, expansiveness and reciprocal love.

I would emphasize, however, that it is caregiver attunement to the child/patient’s pain, and perhaps especially pain that is reactive to the caregiver, that is critical. When the child shares with his caregivers satisfying, expansive experiences of his contextual embeddedness with them, the caregivers are likely to respond with interested, attuned focus, if only because such experiences will typically harmonize with their narcissism. What happens, however, when the child attempts to communicate to his caregivers his painful, depressive experiences of interaction? It may be especially in contexts where caregivers are attuned and receptive to the child’s experiences or expectations of painful caregiver interaction, whether past or perhaps more importantly present and anticipated-future, that the child builds enduring confidence that contextual features of his or her painful affect are acceptable, instead of fraught with undesirability and conflict.

With respect to the facet of thrownness-into-other experience that accents one’s deliverance into others, I contend that caregiver attunement to the person’s distinctive experiences of his existential helplessness, choicelessness and vulnerability to the defining determinism of the particular others given to his developmental system enables him to own these feelings as mine. Attunement to these feelings also leads to his experiencing them as valid and worthy manifestations of himself as thrown-into, and
partially individualized by, the particular others, and their emotional characters, that are constitutive of his person and emotional character.

In relational contexts that prohibit narcissistically offensive experiences of caregivers, and contemporaneously require narcissistically favorable ones, the person will develop the conviction that owning his distinctive perceptions and feelings about his thrownness-into-others as mine is prohibited and dangerous. Defense against these dangers will likely entail the person’s dis-ownership of his views of, and feelings about, his embeddedness in others, and his thrownness into it.

Such dis-ownership voids or strips subjective experience of the sense of thrownness-into-others (see Maduro 2008). Organizations stripped of the sense of the relational, or “into-other,” facet will manifest, for example, in grandiose feelings of invulnerability to others --past and present-- including losses of, or injuries by, them, or in the abused person’s perception that, “Time heals all wounds inflicted by others.” Organizations stripped of the sense of helplessness and choicelessness, or the “thrownness-into,” facet will manifest, for example, in fantasies of grandiose agency over one’s relational situation, obsessive efforts to orchestrate emotional interactions, or in the traumatized person’s reflection, with respect to restoring her innocence, that, “Where there’s a will there’s a way.”

Concluding Remarks: The Clinical Need for Rigorously Relational Theories of Distinctive, Worlded-Selfhood. My developmental claims today imply that the experiential domain pertinent to psychoanalytic phenomenology is constituted not by feelings and perceptions of radically distinct selfhood --what we might call Cartesian
narcissism--- but by experiences of mutually embedded self, other and world.\textsuperscript{19} Although features of experiential selfhood, otherhood, and worldhood can be usefully differentiated as distinct experiential configurations, each nevertheless represents a constitutive element of a larger phenomenological unity in human emotional experiencing.\textsuperscript{20} Accordingly, phenomenological ideals and clinical focus shift from proudly isolated, autonomous selfhood to enriched experiences of self-thrown-into-its-distinctive-relational-world.

In order for psychoanalysis to use and expand upon these existentially informed phenomenological illuminations, we relational psychoanalytic thinkers must integrate into our theoretical canon, even more rigorously than we already have, radically contextual, post-Cartesian explanations. The merit and durability of such explanations will lie in part in their capacity to make psychoanalytic sense of, and further elucidate, the fullest possible range of experiences of man’s existential contextuality or worldedness (see Maduro, 2008). In particular, they will assist clinicians in seeing and understanding both the personal experiences that have been the focus of our attention today, namely, relationally constituted ownership and individuality, or thrown-selfhood (see Maduro 2008; Coburn and Frie, 2010; cf. Stolorow 2009 & 2010), and the relational contexts that either facilitate or obstruct them.

\textsuperscript{19} Elucidation herein of the phenomenology of thrownness-into-others and distinctive, worlded-selfhood extends relational psychoanalysis’ expansive rebellion against the sharp, decontextualizing phenomenology of radically distinct self and other that has, for so long, been produced and relied upon by conventional Cartesian philosophical and clinical perspectives.

\textsuperscript{20} Stolorow (2009) writes: “[E]xperiences of selfhood [and I would add: ‘otherhood,’] and of the world we inhabit are inextricably bound up with one another in a broader contextual unity, such that ‘any dramatic change in the one necessarily entails corresponding changes in the other’” (p. 4, quoting Stolorow, Atwood & Orange 2002, p. 145; bracketed text mine).
REFERENCES


